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Cathal Woods (Virginia Wesleyan College)1 
 
 
Abstract: Many scholars hold that in Plato's Republic philosophers who rule suffer in terms of 
philosophical activity. This view is based largely on Socrates' silence on the matter in response to a 
complaint from Glaucon. Yet two major themes of Republic maintain that philosophers who act justly 
and rule do not suffer in terms in philosophy: (i) with respect to the material goods and physical 
security which are pre-requisites for philosophical activity, philosophers benefit from the support of 
the city, and (ii) rule by inferior people is inimical to philosophy. I develop these two themes, disarm 
in passing the evidence for thinking that the philosophers are worse off, and consider four types of 
non-ruling philosopher — "spontaneous", "besotted" "wealthy" and "deceitful" philosophers. None of 
the four fares better in terms of philosophical activity than ruling philosophers. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
At Republic 517b, in discussing the allegory of the Cave, Socrates explains that the cave 
and the upper world should be mapped onto the visible and knowable realms of the Line, 
respectively. The people who have ascended out of the cave and been able to look at the brightest 
objects are thus those who have achieved comprehension of the highest intellectual objects. 
These people are philosophers (520a4, cf. 521c52). Socrates states that philosophers who have 
ascended cannot spend their time continuously contemplating the forms but instead must be 
 
1 Particular thanks are due to Allan Silverman. Thanks also to Eric Brown, Amy Coplan and Tom Tuozzo, 
and to audiences at the University of Kansas and the Virginia Philosophical Association.  
2 Parenthetical references are to Republic unless otherwise stated. Translations are from Grube, revised by 
Reeve (1992). 
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persuaded3 to return to the "cave" to rule (519c5, cf. 517d7, 519e3, 521b6).  
Glaucon thinks that the philosophers could be living some other, better, life, a life of 
continued contemplation presumably, and so he thinks that returning to rule impedes the 
philosophers' happiness. He calls the necessity that they rule "an injustice". In his response, 
Socrates denies the injustice and contradicts Glaucon by saying that it is just for the philosophers 
to rule (519e). Socrates does not immediately respond to Glaucon's protestation that the 
philosophers are worse off than they might be and by his silence he gives the appearance of 
conceding Glaucon's point about happiness: returning to rule is just, but the life of ruling is not 
the happiest one for the philosophers.  
Understood in this way, the philosophers' return is a prima facie case in which justice 
doesn't pay. This is contrary to an (and probably the) overall thesis of Republic, that being just is 
always more to one's advantage than being unjust. Although it as has been argued that there is no 
explicit assertion in Republic that the philosophers fare less well than they otherwise might 
because of ruling,4 most scholars have agreed that justice, in the philosophers' case, is 
disadvantageous. John Cooper, for example, writes that "[e]xtraneous circumstances prevent the 
city from giving the philosophers, and only them,5 the best life of which ... they are capable".6 
Richard Kraut states that philosophers are "willing to sacrifice their proper interest for the sake 
of others"7 where their "proper interest" is philosophical activity. 
Most scholars go on to argue that acting justly nonetheless benefits the philosophers. 
They do this by revising what the philosophers' interest is. The philosophers' obvious interest is 
philosophy, paradigmatically contemplation of the forms, but scholars argue that there is 
 
3 In this article I will not be addressing the problem of the philosophers' reluctance or the need for 
"compulsion" or the explicit motivation of the philosophers. I have previously treated these issues in 
Woods (2009).  
4 E.g. Mahoney (1992) p. 269 ff. For some discussion, see Brown (2000) n. 3 
5 White (1979) likewise thinks the philosophers suffer while others in the city do not. He does not think 
this is an inconsistency. 
6 Cooper (2000) p. 23. 
7 Kraut (1973) p. 338.  
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something else that philosophers value more, and benefit more from, than philosophy.8 One 
strategy is to claim that philosopher value not only contemplating the forms but imitating them. 
Cooper, for example,9 holds that philosophers benefit by ruling because "[w]hat they care most 
about is the rational order of the lives they lead in pursuing and enjoying rational order more 
generally."10 He then argues that a major part of this pursuit is ruling the city.11   
Another approach is to argue that philosophers value the just state of their souls above 
anything else, and that civic justice (or "vulgar" justice, to use Sachs' terminology12) is necessary 
for psychic justice. In the philosophers' particular case, civic justice involves ruling because 
ruling is what philosophers are required to do for the polis in return for their education.13 In this 
way, even though ruling is detrimental to contemplation, it is beneficial for psychic justice.  
Both approaches have in common some expansion or modification of the philosophers' 
interest. Contemplation is certainly a good for philosophers — it's their desire to continue 
contemplating the forms (517c7, 519c3) that provides them with a temptation not to rule — but it 
is not the only good for a philosopher. Once this is realized, it can be argued that philosophers 
value, and achieve by ruling, something other than contemplation and this compensates for the 
loss of contemplation because it is valued more.  
 
8 See Kraut (1991) n.1 and Mahoney (1992) n. 1 for lists of those who hold that the happiness of 
philosophers is negatively affected at least in some way. 
9 Into this category of approach fall Gosling (1973) p. 71, Irwin (1979), White (1986), Kraut (1991) and 
(1992) and Mahoney (1992). Cooper (2000) is endorsed by Silverman (2007) p. 50-1 and p. 47. For some 
others, see Brown (2000) n. 13. A debate associated with this position is whether the philosopher is a self 
at all, for which see Cooper (1977) and Waterlow (1973). A more specific version of this approach is that 
philosophers desire to bring about virtue in others. This is the approach of Kraut (1973) and Vernezze 
(1992). 
10 Cooper (2000) p. 23.  
11 Cooper (2000) p. 17. Also Cooper (1977). 
12 Sachs (1963). Cf. 441e where the account of justice is tested against "vulgar" standards.  
13 Brickhouse (1981). Cf. Brown (2000) p. 11, Mahoney (1992) p. 275. A debate associated with this 
position is the "gap" between the two conceptions of justice made popular in modern times by Sachs 
(1963). (See Pakaluk at http://dissoiblogoi.blogspot.com/2005/11/republic-442d-443b.html and 
http://dissoiblogoi.blogspot.com/2005/11/was-there-scholarship-before-1963.html for the claim that this 
problem had previously been pointed out by Grote (1867) as described in Kahn (1996) p. 49).   
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In what follows I'll articulate a different type of response to the problem, one that holds 
that the philosophers do not suffer in terms of contemplation by doing what is just, that is, by 
ruling. This position is consistent with two major themes of Republic. Both will be familiar to 
readers of the work, but I will develop each in some detail by picking up each thread at different 
places in the text. I first return to the work's overall thesis that justice is more to one's benefit 
than injustice and bring out what I think has been an underdeveloped aspect of Socrates' 
argument, namely that justice allows interdependent parts to function well. This means that 
ruling is beneficial to the philosophers because the other members of the city, when just, support 
the philosophers' contemplation by providing them with their other (non-intellectual) goods in 
return for ruling. Here I'll be drawing on books 2, 4 and 5. The second major theme is that if 
philosophers do not rule, someone inferior will, and philosophers, both in development and after 
having achieved enlightenment, do not fare well when the city is controlled by non-philosophers, 
because philosophy is not supported. Here, I'll be drawing on books 1, 6 and 8.  
These two central themes mean that the philosophers fare as well as they can with respect 
to contemplation by ruling, and in order to show this, I'll consider four guises that non-ruling 
philosophers might take and analyze their well-being in terms of the two main themes. These are 
"spontaneous" philosophers, "besotted" philosophers, "(independently) wealthy" philosophers 
and "deceitful" philosophers. In every case, these philosophers do not do better in terms of 
contemplation than philosophers who rule. 
If my interpretation is successful, there will no need to appeal to additional values (such 
as a desire to imitate the forms or psychic justice) in order to explain why the philosophers' 
return is beneficial for them, though one might do so on other grounds. The purpose of the 
present paper is not to deny any role to these additional values but only to defend in full14 the 
position that there is no tension between ruling and philosophical activity. 
 
14 Faring well in terms of contemplation seems to me to be the straightforward reading of Republic, since, 
on the surface at least, justice is supposed to make one better off than injustice, and contemplation is the 
activity of philosophers. But surprisingly few people have held or argued for the position that ruling does 
not negatively impact the philosophers' livelihood. These are Davies (1968), Beatty (1976a), Reeve 
(1988) pp. 202-3 and Cross & Woozley (1964) p. 101. Cross & Woozley's entire discussion can be 
included here: 'They will take their share of ruling, not because they want to, but because they recognise 
4 
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2. Justice and the Interdependence of the Classes 
In book 2, the principle of specialization (369e2-370c5) provides the organizing principle 
of the city and later (in book 4) becomes the basis for Socrates' definition of justice, that a whole 
— whether a city or a soul — is just when each part of the whole does and has its own (433a1-5, 
433b3-434a1). The interconnectedness brought about by specialization benefits each class and 
provides a reason for each, including the class of philosophers, to do its part.  
According to the principle of specialization, each class performs its function on behalf of 
itself and everyone else (369e3). Potters, for example, make enough pots for everyone. In the 
basic city, each type of producer benefits straightforwardly from specialization by receiving 
material goods that it needs or wants. The principle of specialization was introduced in the basic 
city because each of four or five different kinds of goods were needed — food, shoes, woven 
goods, wooden goods and medicine. Producers, generally speaking, produce material goods and 
derive pleasure from their enjoyment of material goods. When the warriors and then the 
philosophers (or: guardians) are added, different types of work and different types of good are 
introduced: the warriors' work is defense of the whole city and their good is honor; the 
philosophers' work is ruling over the whole city and their good is contemplation of the forms.  
In the simple city, it was to each individual's advantage if the tasks of producing the 
different goods (and later of equipping the producers and distributing their products) was the 
exclusive focus of different workers. Although the goods "produced" by the two additional 
classes of warriors and guardians are of novel types, the principle of specialization, and the 
benefits each class achieves from it, still hold. That is, it is still the case that each of the classes 
has a need of each of the other classes, and that they specialize in this way because it is to their 
advantage.  
 
that other men, lacking the knowledge, would do the job worse than themselves, and because they 
acknowledge it as a duty which they must perform as the price of their privilege of being allowed to 
spend the rest of their time doing what they really want to do, viz. engage in philosophical research." 
Beatty's treatment is a full paper, but nothing I say here appears there. His argument is that the 
philosopher needs to rule in order to be confronted with "the most challenging arguments which 
practically ensure his progress in the pursuit of truth" (p. 566).  
5 
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The good that philosophers supply to the other citizens is good governance. The 
philosophers are best at ruling because only the philosophers have a "clear model in their souls" 
(the forms and/or the form of goodness) to which they "make constant reference" when 
governing (484c8-10), though their eyes must be acclimated to the darkness of the cave so that 
they can apply their knowledge of the forms to the material world. In this way they are the best 
(and indeed, the only) people who can plan and organize for the benefit of the parts of the city 
both individually and severally. The artisan and warrior classes, being moderate,15 agree with the 
philosophers that the philosophers are the people best suited to rule and agree to produce and to 
soldier on their behalf. Since the philosophers must contemplate in order to be able to do the 
work of ruling, this means that the other classes are supporting contemplation, even if in their 
eyes they do so as a means to their own, respective, goods.  
The producers and warriors are said to fare best on their own terms when they act in 
accordance with the dictates of the philosophers; the organization of artisans and warriors that 
the philosophers prescribe makes them happy (590d) and with respect to the producers and 
warriors in particular, Socrates claims that they will be better off under the rule of philosophers 
because they will pursue their respective goals moderately and not in the manner of a leaky sieve 
(586b2). It's thus in the interest of the members of the artisan and warrior classes to perform their 
own tasks and only their own tasks, and in particular, not to compete for power with the 
philosophers. Thus the other classes benefit from the additional specialized job of the 
philosophers.  
In return for playing their part by governing, the philosophers receive their "upkeep" 
(420a1, 465d, 543b5) from the producers and warriors. That is, they receive security from the 
warriors and material goods from the producers. Neither class can directly provide the 
philosophers with their good (contemplation), but each provides the philosophers with something 
that they need if they are to do their job and enjoy their good, just as the warriors and producers 
 
15 The philosophers in non-philosophic states are thought by their fellow-citizens to be "useless" (487d3, 
e2, 488d2, e4, 489b4, d3) except by oligarchic or democratic leaders imposing their own agendas. But if 
the citizens who call philosophers "useless" realized that navigating the ship of state required so much by 
way of training and knowledge (488a-e), they would go begging at the door of the philosopher (489b7). 
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consider good governance a necessity for what they (respectively) really value. The need the 
philosophers have of the other classes is derived from the fact that, despite their highly rational 
nature and emphasis on education, they (the philosophers) are still human beings with integrated 
tri-partite souls. 
That the philosophers benefit is enshrined in the central belief instilled by their education, 
that 'what's good for the city is good for me' (412d4-e6, 502e2-503a2). Even though trainee 
philosophers appear to be expected to cling to this motto as an article of faith — the truth of the 
motto might not be understood by the philosophers until after they achieve knowledge of 
goodness — it is presumably correct.16  
Socrates in fact claims (at 465d) that the life of the philosopher will be "most blessed", 
more so even than Olympic victors who are rewarded with meals at public expense.17  
Philosophers achieve an even greater accomplishment — ruling an ideal city — and their upkeep 
is correspondingly "more complete" and extends to "all the necessities of life" (465d10). 
Socrates then explicitly returns to Adeimantus' complaint that the guardians fail to benefit from 
their position. It's now clear, he says, that they fare supremely well. This life, Socrates says, 
allows the philosophers to maintain a philosophical life (465d2-466c4 c.f. 421a-b) because it is 
"moderate, stable, and – as we say – best" (466b5). 18 
 
16 Beatty 1976b pp. 135-6 expresses surprise at the idea that the philosophers are simply indoctrinated into 
the belief that justice is in their advantage. As he writes elsewhere (1976a), "Philosophic questions cannot 
be finally resolved either by faith or social engineering." (p. 570). As I discuss in Woods (2009), the 
mature philosopher must decide for him- or herself that the motto of his/her education is true. 
17 And therefore more blessed than Socrates, who, in Socrates' Defense (36d), suggested that he be 
rewarded with meals in the Prytaneum, the same reward as was granted to Olympic victors, because he 
was the greatest good that could come to Athens.  
18 Another statement of the belief that philosophers fare well occurs when the parts of the soul are 
distinguished. Concerning reason in particular, we learn that reason is distinct from appetite and thumos 
because it alone can consider the good of all of the parts, including itself (441e3, 409a1). Similarly in the 
city, the wisdom of the city stems from the fact that the philosophers know what is advantageous to each 
part, which would include the philosophers themselves (442c5-8). (This passage does not state that what 
is best for the philosophers is contemplation.) Knowledge of what is good for oneself and others is 
useless, in a situation of interdependence, if one is not a position to implement that knowledge, and so, 
even though ruling is not explicitly mentioned here, the benefit comes by ruling.  
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Such exuberant statements differ from Socrates' reticence in his replies to Adeimantus 
and Glaucon (at 420 and 519) who object on behalf of the warriors and the philosophers, 
respectively. His failure to clearly contradict Glaucon's protestations gives the impression that 
the philosophers are made worse off by ruling and in responding to Adeimantus he mentions (as 
he also does with Glaucon) that their goal is not to make any one group exceedingly happy, but 
to make the city happy.  
But even in these cases he asserts, both times, that the class in question fares well. To 
Glaucon's objection on behalf of the philosophers he says they have been put in charge as "kings 
in our city and leaders of the swarm" for the sake of both the citizens and themselves (520b6 
humin te autois). And in reply to Adeimantus he says "it wouldn't be surprising if these people 
were happiest just as they are" (420b4-5) before following this up with an explanation of how 
playing one's part is the way to gain the greatest possible benefit.  
Socrates discusses what would happen if one of the classes were afforded its interest 
exclusively. Socrates imagines a city in which the farmers and potters and cobblers are 
permanently at ease (420e). The farmers are given robes and jewelry and are told to work the 
land "for pleasure". Potters spend all of their time feasting, though they do have their wheels 
beside them, in case the urge strikes them. And so on for each of the classes.19 Such indulgence 
destroys the pattern (skhêma) that makes a city (421a1-2) and the destruction of the city means 
the break-down of the reciprocal relations between the classes and with it the advantages that 
follow from the division of labor. Each class thus undermines its own happiness by pursuing a 
life of constant feasting. Being a potter on holiday might seem like a great life, but in fact it is 
self-defeating.  
This contrast between making one class exceedingly happy and the well-being of the 
whole by each class doing its own are made in response to Adeimantus' objection on behalf of 
 
19 Socrates says that each of the classes and the whole city can be made happy in this way, at 420e9. But 
he then immediately says that we must be dealing with some other form of life (421b2). These final words 
suggest that the outstanding happiness of each part at the same time is impossible and a mere figment of 
his imagination. For where would all of the goods come from which the producers enjoy, if the producers 
are on holiday?  
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the warriors. If they are carried over to Glaucon's later objection on behalf of the philosophers, 
the philosophers too would be happiest by performing their function within the city.  We can 
imagine a parallel life for the philosophers in which they do not rule but are at leisure, but such a 
life will bring down the city and ultimately prove self-defeating.20  
Socrates' message, then, is that work and "play" must be mixed. It is only in the 
underworld that human beings will find relief from their burdens. This thought is made explicit 
by the references to the Isles of the Blessed, which apply specifically to the philosophers (519c4, 
540b8). The Isles of the Blessed are a part of the underworld to where the exceptional go upon 
death. As in the rest of Hades, they are a place where the body becomes insubstantial and has no 
nutritive or protective needs such as might be taken care of by artisans and warriors. Moreover, 
there is no need for governance. In such a place, then, one can philosophize all day long.21 The 
possibility of a life of uninterrupted philosophy, however, is an unreal position.22 Philosophers in 
this world do not escape the need for co-operation and for governance. The best they can hope 
for, according to Socrates, is a life provided with security and material support which will allow 
them to divide their time between the intellectual activities of contemplating the forms and using 
 
20 There are a number of places where Socrates mentions that fact that the philosophers and the rest of the 
citizens do well simultaneously. One is 520b6, referenced above (p. 9). Another goes back to book 1, 
where Socrates argues that just rulers rule on behalf of the ruled. The phrase "ruling in the interest of the 
ruled" might suggest that ruling is exclusively a benefit for the ruled, and a disadvantage to those who 
rule, which fits with the worry that philosophers do not benefit from ruling. There is no inconsistency, 
however, as book 1 also contains the possibility that the "captain" is also a "sailor" (341c9, 342d7, cf. 
409a1). In book 1 Socrates emphasizes that rulers rule on behalf of the ruled in order to point up the 
contrast with those who rule unjustly in their own interest, the epitome of which is the Thrasymachean 
position that justice is the advantage of the ruler. But to say that rulers rule on behalf of the ruled and not 
in their own (unjust) interest, is not incompatible with the claim that they simultaneously rule justly on 
their own behalf. See also fn. 48. 
21 Cf. the end of Socrates' Defense where Socrates hopes to spend the rest of his life talking with heroes 
and the wise (40e-41c). In their interpretations of the Republic as a whole, Strauss (1964) and Bloom 
(1968) emphasize the thought that Plato "disregards the realities of human nature." (This phrase is from 
Hall (1977).)  
22 Such possibilities are postulated by Glaucon and Adeimantus rather than Socrates himself. Their 
objections indicate that they have not taken on board the interdependence of the parts and perhaps explain 
the reticence in Socrates' replies. 
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that knowledge to rule. Being provided with one's upkeep in return for ruling is as close as 
human life can come to life in the Isles of the Blessed. 
In sum, the principle of specialization creates reciprocal relationships within the city. The 
city is a structure for non-zero-sum co-operation, by which each class gets the most of what it 
wants (pleasure, honor or contemplation) and more than if it attempted to provide itself with all 
three kinds of goods (material goods, security, governance). By ruling, the philosophers 
simultaneously make the other classes most happy and ensure that their own needs are met, 
governing over a society which supports contemplation. By being just, the philosophers (and 
producers and warriors) will be as happy as they can be, where by "can be" I mean that they are 
not as happy as they could imaginably be (as in the image of the feasting potters or the Isles of 
the Blessed) but as happy as they can be in reality (the kallipolis). The objective of making the 
city as whole happy and not make any one group exceedingly happy (420b, 519c) is not 
incompatible with the goal of making each class as happy as it can be. The delight of 
contemplation must be mixed with the trouble of work, just as physical pleasure is mixed with 
physical labor in the case of the productive classes and honor is mixed with military activity in 
the case of the warriors.  
An objection to the claim that justice is beneficial for the philosophers serves to bring out 
this theme of justice and (contemplative) benefit intertwined. The objection is that construing the 
philosophers' well-being in terms of contemplation or in terms of upkeep is erroneous because 
'Glaucon's Challenge' (from book 2) concerns the intrinsic benefit of justice and specifically 
rules out the consequences or the "wages" of justice.23 If I have argued that the philosophers' 
 
23 When speaking of "wages" (in Glaucon's challenge), Socrates and Glaucon could be referring ahead to 
either or both the "wage" of the threat of being ruled by an inferior (346e-347a) with its impact on 
contemplation (as will be discussed in the next part of the paper) or the "upkeep" that the philosophers 
earn in exchange for their ruling (420a,1 465d, 543b5, 613e4. 543bc states explicitly that the upkeep is 
the wage the philosophers receive. See the next section for references to occasions on which 'not being 
ruled by an inferior' is referred to as a wage.). 
10 
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contemplation will fare best as a "consequence" of the just act of ruling, I have not given an 
answer that Glaucon would accept.24 
In response, we must first note that Glaucon's question is posed at the level of the 
individual, and not at the level of the city and its classes.25 We must transfer the objection from 
the psychic to the civic level. Justice in the soul is the psychic harmony of the parts of the soul, 
each performing its function,26 and in the city is the harmonious functioning of the different 
classes. In each case, the well-functioning of each of the parts is dependent on the well-
functioning of the others. Thus, the objection just above alleges that the philosophers, as a 
constituent class of the city, fare best when the city is just, as a consequence of the city's 
justness.  
Put this way, it is not clear in what sense contemplation or the security and material 
goods provided by the warriors and producers to the philosophers are consequences of the city's 
justness even though they are wages paid by the other classes. The city is just precisely when the 
philosophers function as well as possible through the help of the other classes. The philosophers' 
upkeep, which enables their ruling and contemplation, counts as part of what it is for the city to 
be just, rather than the consequences of justice. At the level of the individual, analogously, the 
soul is just when its three parts perform well, provide some good to the others and enjoy the 
object of their desires. 
Describing the exchange of goods between the classes with the word "consequences" 
would be to forget that Socrates has followed Glaucon's move from an externally-regarding 
perspective on justice to an internally-regarding one. When Glaucon speaks of consequences he 
 
24 Brown (2000) n. 4. For discussion see Beatty (1976a) pp. 140-2. Interestingly, Brickhouse (1981) p. 
146 makes this kind of objection against Kraut's (1973) notion of extended interest. If Socrates' response 
to Glaucon's challenge is to be restricted to the intrinsic benefits of a just soul and contemplation were an 
extrinsic benefit, it would not follow that the philosopher is worse off in terms of contemplation, which is 
the explicit concern of this paper. Rather, the question would be open — the philosophers might do better 
or worse in terms of contemplation while at the same time deriving whatever intrinsic benefits there are to 
being just. 
25 Sachs' "fallacy" lies lurking in the background. See footnotes 12 and 13 above for references.  
26 The function of each part is what it alone does or does best (352e2, 353a8, 433a. See also 444de, where 
Socrates describes virtue as being like health and cf. 610c.). 
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speaks of benefits or harms that might accrue to the whole in its relations with other wholes. In 
book 2, he is speaking about the consequences that might happen to the individual from other 
individuals — such as reputation from humans and a good place in the underworld from the gods 
(as discussed in book 10) — and by analogy the consequences for a city would be the benefits 
and harms to it from other cities. What he (Glaucon) is particularly interested in are not the 
external consequences of justice, but the impact of justice in its own right, to the unit which is 
just, which, in Socrates' hands, becomes how the harmony of the soul's parts is beneficial to the 
soul, that is, how the soul fares best when its parts co-operate with one another.  
Similarly, while the description of injustice as a "civil war" (as e.g. at 351-2) places the 
emphasis on the question of what single part should rule, it's also true that all the parts are 
affected — think of "destroyed utterly" from 421a8 and "destroys these people and the rest of the 
city" from 520e-521b (and see also 473c9-d4). Indeed, the decline of souls and constitutions 
involves the successive limiting of the proper functioning of the parts, beginning with the 
installation of the warriors as rulers (547de and following for the corresponding individual). The 
harm of injustice described in books 8 and 9 is not portrayed there a consequence of an unjust 
soul. Rather, books 8 and 9 work out in detail what it is like to have (or, to be) an unjust soul. 
The soul becomes more unjust as its parts cease to co-operate. It's only in book 10 (at 612b and 
following) that Socrates returns to the consequences of justice. 
It might still be objected that each class has in fact two activities: its useful function to 
the state and its preferred goal, and only the former is involved in the justness of the city. Ruling, 
therefore, and not contemplation, is the activity by which philosophers contribute to, or 
constitute in part, the justness of the city, since this is what they do for others and for which they 
are paid with the wages of security and material goods which enable contemplation. While this 
objection might be more damaging in the cases of the warriors and producers, it does not hold up 
in the case of the philosophers, for as we have seen, constant reference to the forms is necessary 
if ruling is to be done well.  
 
3. Rule By An Inferior 
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I turn now from what might be called the "positive" side of the argument (that 
philosophers do as well in terms of contemplation by their mutual dependence on the other 
classes) to the "negative", that the philosophers suffer, or can do no better, in terms of 
contemplation when they do not rule. In the current section (3), I will briefly discuss how, if 
philosophers do not rule, someone else must rule, and then discuss the impact of this situation on 
the developing philosopher and on the first of four non-ruling philosophers, the "spontaneous" 
philosopher. Here, the focus is on the quality of the philosopher's intellectual life. In section 4, 
where I consider three more non-ruling philosophers — "deceitful", "besotted" and "wealthy" 
philosophers — it is on the quantity of contemplation. 
In book 1 of Republic, improper rulers see ruling as a way to get more of what they want 
for themselves. The job of ruling, properly done, looks to the good of the subjects (446e3 and 
preceding, 342e4 and preceding). Yet even those with the correct conception of ruling are 
described as requiring some wage, to make the task worthwhile — no one, whether just or 
unjust, simply wants to rule for its own sake. The available wages are money (in tyrannical or 
democratic regimes) or honor (in military regimes) or a punishment for not ruling. This third 
"wage" is the wage of philosophers,27 who are not interested in money or honor (347a).  
The other members of the city can only offer material goods or honor. These are coveted 
by tyrants, the masses and the military but are unappealing to philosophers, at least when in 
exchange for the task of ruling. Philosophers thus do not perceive ruling to be "something good 
or something to be enjoyed" (347c7) in the same way as other leaders and the fact that the other 
classes cannot give them what they most value is said to make the well-governed city a 
possibility (520e4, cf. 347d). They are thus motivated to rule not by something positive but by a 
punishment. Despite their direct disinterest, philosophers have an indirect interest in ruling. The 
punishment for the philosophers is that if they do not rule, other people, who are necessarily 
worse than they are, will rule in their place (347c3).  
 
27 The word "philosophers" is not used at this stage of the work. Rather, the people in question are 
referred to here as "the best people" (347a8). It is clear, however, that those who will later be identified as 
philosophers are the best people. Indeed, the similar phrase "the best natures" is used in the return to the 
cave section of Republic at 519c8. 
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Being ruled by inferiors is a punishment because if the philosophers do not rule, someone 
with a different type of soul must take their place, and the regime will reflect that leadership.28 
We can spell out the negative consequences of inferior rule by turning to Socrates' account (in 
book 8) of how the best regime degenerates into successively worse regimes. Each such regime 
is analogous to a condition of the human soul (368e2 ff.) and Socrates provides descriptions of 
the different individuals who typify each of the regimes as he proceeds through them. The first 
degradation is the Cretan or Spartan regime (544c2) or timarchy, in which the military are in 
command (or in the soul, thumos or: spirit.) Socrates then describes in graphic detail the rise to 
power of the money-lovers and their subsequent splintering and downward spiral into chaos. In 
 
28 An objection to the idea that an inferior will rule stems from the fact that Socrates often mentions that 
there will be a number of philosophers. If this is so, any of them could take over if an individual 
philosopher should absent him- or her-self, and since none of them is inferior, it is false that 'an inferior 
will rule' (Aronson (1972) p. 397, Kraut (1973) p. 332, Brickhouse (1981) pp. 144-5, White (1986) p. 25, 
Brown (2000) p. 4). From this, however, it does not follow that a better life is available, for it assumes 
that the errant philosopher will retain the status of philosopher even though she refuses to work. But this 
assumption is untenable. The philosopher will not be supported by the other philosophers who have been 
forced to rule, just as she would fail to be supported by the broader citizenry. He will be expelled from his 
position and have to make a living for himself, with all of the consequences we have seen above. (Beatty 
(1976a) notes that any remaining philosophers will demand reasons for the abdication and that it is 
consistent with the philosophers' love of dialectic that any philosopher threatening to quit will provide an 
answer or engage in the pursuit of one (p. 139).) Further, none of the scholars who employ the "multiple 
philosophers" objections explain away the threat of being ruled by an inferior. This text is simply ignored, 
even though it directly contradicts their point. (Brown (2000) n. 4 perhaps does the most work.) The 
theme of being ruled by an inferior is moreover repeated at 520e-521b, which is a part of the discussion of 
the return to the cave. There, Socrates states "if beggars hungry for private goods go into public life … 
then ruling is something fought over, and this civil and domestic war destroys these people and the rest of 
the city as well." In this quote "these people" might refer to the disputants to power rather than the 
philosophers, but in any case, the philosophers are included among "the rest of the city". Further, when 
the soul is considered analogously, it is not at all clear what it would be for reason to abdicate its 
responsibility for ruling to other rulers. This impossibility is important if we imagine that a philosopher 
might attempt to deceive her fellow philosophers by appearing to rule but not actually doing so. (For 
discussion of the deceitful philosophers relationship to the other classes, see section 4, below.) In light of 
these remarks, an obvious way to resolve the contradiction between the two ideas (that an inferior will 
rule, that there are a number of philosophers) is to assume that Socrates' real target is the claim that 
philosophy (whether in the form of one philosopher or more) should rule (and related issues). He thus 
switches naturally between the singular and the plural. The section of text in which Socrates and Glaucon 
discuss the 'return to the cave' switches between individual and plural philosophers (519c-e) suggesting 
that no difference is implied in the situations of a single philosopher or a group. And this is the way I 
have dealt with the issue in this article, until the point of the "multiple philosophers" objection.  
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oligarchy the wealthiest people (analogous to the strongest appetites) rule. Oligarchy is said to be 
the first regime to permit the "greatest evil" — total bankruptcy of a person (552a), who becomes 
a beggar or a thief (552d3). The analogue in the soul would be one of the appetites growing so 
weak that it no longer performs its function but instead is perverted into an unnecessary desire 
(558d ff.). Democracy then occurs when such people become numerous and take over, while 
tyranny is total disorder, a living nightmare in which not even the most beastly and savage 
desires go unchecked (571cd).  
All of these regimes privilege or are dominated by something other than philosophy and 
as a result in all of them the people who have a philosophic nature receive no support. As 
Socrates says (when discussing oligarchy) "what is valued is always practiced, and what isn't 
valued is neglected" (551a3, cf. 485d7). Thus, even in timarchy, the focus on war means that 
there is no place for thinking not devoted to military preparation and success. Although the 
citizens of a timarchy recognize the need for rulers — the worst regimes lack any 
acknowledgement that leadership is necessary — they are afraid to appoint wise people as rulers 
(547d8). Rather, since all of the efforts of the city are directed towards war (548a1) they put 
correspondingly inclined and abled people in charge.  
Although his topic is the character of the deviant cities and personalities, Socrates is 
fairly explicit in saying that what is missing from these cities and souls is a love of learning. A 
city under such rulers does not promote philosophical wisdom, and so, Socrates states, pays no 
attention to learning (554b4), while the timocratic youth is said to lack the best guardian of all, 
reason (549b). In this way, Socrates tells us that the good of the philosophers, which they 
diminish by failing to rule, is philosophy.  
In section 4 I shall spell out the details of what life for a philosopher is like in such a city, 
when I consider the possibility that a non-ruling philosopher could flourish in such a city. 
Socrates, however, seems to hold the fate of the developing philosophic nature to be more 
important, for he considers it in the some detail in book 6, in the discussion from 490e onward.29 
 
29 See especially 491d5, 492a2, 495a. Socrates' emphasis on the developing nature might indicate that the 
question of mature philosophers returning from the cave is moot if the philosophical talent of the young 
person has not first been developed. If correct, this would make the fourth section of this paper otiose.  
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So, let us turn to that first. A young person with a philosophic nature faces a difficult future in a 
city that does not value philosophy (494a ff). The majority of people look upon philosophy with 
suspicion, as, therefore, do the leaders of the city, since they are trying to win the support of the 
majority. At the same time, since the (proto-) philosopher is an able person, he is courted by 
those in power. Since none of the present constitutions is directed towards philosophy, Socrates 
says (497b1, 498de), the growth of philosophers within them is "perverted and altered" (497b3). 
A "philosophic nature" under the wrong conditions is like a plant in an unsuitable soil and ends 
up being of a different character (497bc). It's in this way, Socrates says, that the greatest evils 
come about — when a great talent is perverted (491de, 495b1-4). Analogously, Socrates is 
saying that reason can only flourish within a soul when the other parts do not overwhelm and 
pervert the growth of reason as it develops. If a soul is directed towards the fulfillment of a 
particular appetite, reason will be pressed into service.  
Now, despite the pressures that philosophic natures face, book 6 appears to allows that it 
is possible to become a philosopher in a deviant regime. Socrates provides himself and Theages 
(496bc) as examples of people who have turned to philosophy and "consort with philosophy in a 
way that's worthy of her" (496a9). They have escaped the disapproval of the majority and the 
wiles of their leaders only by some "divine dispensation" (493a) — Theages is kept from politics 
by his ill-health, Socrates by his divine sign (496bc). In the return to the cave, Socrates similarly 
speaks of "spontaneous" (automatoi and autophues, 520b2, b3) philosophers, who have come to 
be in other cities against the will of their constitutions (520a7). Since the philosophical 
development of Socrates, Theages and the spontaneous philosophers has not been impeded by 
living in a deviant regime, and, since they will not be called upon to govern, it would seem that 
ruling is not necessary for a philosopher to do as well as possible. These "spontaneous 
philosophers" thus present a challenge to the claim that the philosopher requires and benefits 
from a supportive regime. (The spontaneous philosopher represents the first of four guises that 
non-ruling philosophers might take. The other three are considered in part 4.) 
However, Socrates says that although philosophers might spontaneously come into being, 
they would have been better off if they had lived in a city that esteemed education. "[U]nder a 
suitable one [= regime] his own [= a philosopher's] growth will be fuller", Socrates says (497a4), 
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and without it a philosophic nature "fails to develop its full power" (497b7) and its true, divine, 
nature (hoti touto men tôi onti theion ên, 497c2) is obscured.  
There are, it seems, more- and less-well-developed philosophers. When Socrates 
mentions the spontaneous "philosophers", he is pointing to a class of people who have not 
received a complete education and who have not reached the heights of philosophy. The 
development of such people has been impeded by living under inferior rulers. The philosophic 
nature sometimes escapes the corrosive effect of living in a deviant regime and can arise 
spontaneously, but fully-formed philosophers cannot.30  
Socrates does not spell out the difference between fully-developed philosophers and the 
inferior kind, but does provide one prominent difference between himself and the philosopher in 
the best regime, namely knowledge of the good. Socrates admits that he does not have 
knowledge of goodness when he says that he is not to be able to describe it, but only an offspring 
of it (506c2). The philosopher of the philosopher's return, by contrast, has attained this 
knowledge. It might thus be that a philosophically supportive environment is necessary for one's 
ultimate success as a philosopher. Even if this is not the case,31 however, there is still some 
difference between philosophers and spontaneous philosophers. Complete philosophical 
development depends on a regime devoted to philosophy, that is, a regime in which philosophers 
rule. If philosophers do not rule, others will steer the polis towards their own ends.  
 
4. Three More Non-Ruling Philosophers 
Being educated under the best regime seems to be a clear advantage of living there. But 
thus far we have been considering only the developing philosopher. While Socrates in book 6 
 
30 The analogous description of the soul of the lover of wisdom, as opposed to the philosopher would 
perhaps be something like the following: In a lover of wisdom one (or more) of the other parts of the soul 
is unruly, but circumstances prevent it from taking over (the "divine dispensation"), thus allowing the 
philosophic part to flourish (somewhat). The urges still interfere with the proper functioning of reason, 
but do not overwhelm reason and make it their slave. In a truly philosophic (though still human) soul, on 
the other hand, the appetites and thumos are not so strong as to attempt to take over the soul but rather 
operate in accordance with reason. 
31 Cf. Davies (1968) pp. 124-6, who claims that the spontaneous philosophers are unlike those 
philosophers raised in the city because they do not acknowledge the forms.  
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considers the plight of those who grow up under non-philosophic regimes, his talk of 
philosophers failing to rule after having ascended to an understanding of goodness (in book 7's 
return to the cave) means that he has in mind the case of fully-formed philosophers. One might 
yet ask whether, for a person raised in the best regime, subsequent ruling is beneficial. The 
philosophers of the return to the cave have already reached the pinnacle of their education and so 
have not suffered in terms of their intellectual development. They now each face the question 
"Should I rule?" Wouldn't it be better for them to spend their time philosophizing, rather than 
ruling?32 Let us turn, then, to the specific choices available to the fully-formed philosophers. I 
will first consider philosophers who might be able to stay in the ideal city. There are two 
varieties of these, "besotted" philosophers and "deceitful" philosophers, and then those for whom 
staying is not an option but who must live under other regimes, "(independently) wealthy" 
philosophers. 
The Besotted Philosopher. The return to the cave makes mention of the spontaneous 
philosophers, which we considered above, but the main figure in this section of the text is a fully 
educated philosopher who is unwilling to rule because the attraction of the forms controls his 
attention. We know that such philosophers in fact return, but we are not sure that they are most 
benefited, in terms of contemplation, by ruling. If we imagine for the moment that the failure to 
rule was not reversed, could philosophers benefit in terms of philosophical activity?  
If their failure to rule were public knowledge (what I call 'deceitful' philosophers will be 
considered next) such philosophers would be relieved of their positions. Let us assume that the 
best city continues under the auspices of other philosophers. How would the remaining rulers 
treat the non-ruling philosophers? Non-ruling philosophers violate the principle of specialization 
and are unjust. It's likely, then, that they would be thrown out of the city, since any place they 
 
32 The spontaneous philosopher, Socrates is careful to say, comes to be "in other cities" (520a-b), which 
implies that they do not come to be in the best city. This is due to its attention to the function and 
happiness of each citizen. The philosophers of the ideal city have undergone a rigorous system of 
education involving close scrutiny of philosophical ability and are unlikely to be overlooked. Further, the 
chances of an artisan or a warrior becoming philosophical are extremely slim, since in the best city each 
class does its own task and leads a life suited to that task. It is possible that they may turn from their work 
to the pursuit of philosophy, like Theages or Socrates, but the education that the philosopher goes 
through, to which the artisan-philosopher has no access, is long and arduous.  
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might assume would not be the best. If allowed to stay, they would be regarded with suspicion, 
as people who refused to play their part in the community.33  
But let us assume that they are allowed to stay and do not suffer in any way from their ill-
repute. What place might they make for themselves within the community? Ex hypothesi, they 
would not be ruling, and so would not receive their upkeep, and would have to be put to work in 
order to earn the goods of the other classes. This living could not be derived from philosophy in 
private practice, since philosophy is valued by the rest of the citizens (on the one hand) only for 
the sake of ruling, which is not their function. Education of developing philosophers, on the other 
hand, is under the control of the ruling philosophers, and again, it is scarcely conceivable that 
unjust philosophers will be allowed to play a role in this education. Thus, the philosophers would 
have to earn their place in the city by working as producers or warriors. We must consider, then, 
in what ways this situation would be better or worse for them in terms of contemplation. There is 
not much in Republic which directly addresses the quality of life of warriors and producers34 in 
comparison with philosophers but we can gather together various points to develop a picture. 
Philosophers are fine warriors, since they begin life by going through the training and 
education of warriors (412-414b); they have received no training in the productive arts. Their 
productive talents (and perhaps to a certain extent their military talents too) are therefore weaker 
and less developed than those who have been trained in them exclusively and are experienced in 
making a living from them.35 Such competition only increases the effort required and interferes 
 
33 See fn. 28, above, for more on the "multiple philosophers" objection. 
34 In an inferior city, philosophers might be able to make a living in education. But in inferior regimes, 
education is a private (and limited) concern. Philosophers who teach would be regarded with suspicion by 
the rest of the populace, as described in part 3.  
35 Philosophers becoming artisans or warriors is an instance of one class meddling in the activity of 
another. Socrates' concern is always with one of the lower classes trying to get above its station, but the 
point holds for the case of philosophers trying to move "down". According to the principle of 
specialization, each person performs the task for which he or she is best suited, but if philosophers are 
artisans (and perhaps also if they are warriors), the city cannot rely on them. 
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more with any contemplation the philosopher-producer might hope to do.36 For its part, military 
activity involves the risks of death and injury, as well as a involving great physical exertion. 
Productive work is also physical, though it includes less strenuous jobs such as selling, trading 
and banking (370-371). Ruling is presumably not any more strenuous or dangerous than these, 
which allows for maximal philosophical effort. 
More important are the psychological implications, of which Socrates makes some 
mention. Philosophers are unique in that their dominant desire is for philosophy rather than 
honor or money. But those who work for the acquisition of material things or honor enlarge the 
corresponding part of their souls, and this is deleterious to the other parts, for whenever one's 
desires are fixated on one thing, one's desire for other things are weakened (485d6-10). Thus, 
even though philosophers would (initially) have the goal of being able to philosophize more 
continuously, they might risk, as warriors, indulging the thumotic part of the soul, or, as 
producers, the money-loving part of the soul.  
It's inappropriate, Socrates says, for philosophers "to take seriously the things for which 
money and large expenditures are needed" (485e2-4, 390d6) instead of focusing on their 
studies.37 It is unfortunately not clear how the corruption occurs (and why one could not perform 
such functions for the sake of philosophy), but it is reasonable to think that philosophers who are 
engaged in productive or military activity would be taking that occupation seriously, if only 
because they are struggling to compete with other citizens. Philosophers desire knowledge, but 
they would be forcing themselves into these other lifestyles when they do not rule. 
 
36 With respect to the amount of time each takes up, ruling, Socrates says, is a small part of a life mostly 
taken up by philosophy (540b1-3). The other jobs have at least some leisure time too, however, and so we 
can't securely conclude that ruling will fare better on this score. 
37 Socrates states that philosophers must not do the work of, or imitate, the other crafts (395b9, 396a6-7) 
and although there's mention of philosopher appreciating beautiful works of art (401c4-8), there is no 
mention of them performing any. At his most disparaging, Socrates states that virtue and wealth are 
opposed to one another, such that "if they were set on a scales, they'd always incline in opposite 
directions" (550e4-6). Note also Socrates questioning Cephalus about his wealth — he doesn't seem to 
love it too much, unlike those who have to make their own money (330b70c1) — as well as the picture of 
the person who loses all his property, at 553b ff. 
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What about the psychological effects of ruling, by comparison? The other jobs risk 
diverting one's desire to other ends, but wouldn't ruling do the same thing, and to the same 
extent? A first response is that that ruling is neutral in a way that productive and military activity 
are not. While pleasure or honor is the goal of productive or military activity, ruling is only a 
means to the goal of the individual and by itself does not reinforce any value, corrosive or 
otherwise. For most people who rule, the goal is in fact honor or pleasure, but for philosophers, 
ruling is seen as a means to some loftier goal (contemplation, imitating the forms, etc.). Ruling 
must of course pay attention to production and soldiering, in order to provide material goods and 
security for the city, and it must see that their creators are rewarded with pleasure and honor, but 
the ultimate product is neither material goods nor security and the ultimate goal is neither 
pleasure nor honor. Ruling only ensures the harmonious well-functioning of all three classes (i.e. 
creates justice) so that the highest goal can be achieved. Those who hold this goal might 
tyrannically employ ruling for their own ends, but the philosophers (as opposed to pleasure- or 
honor-lovers) have the virtue and wisdom to realize that abuse of power is in fact self-defeating. 
Further, we could emphasize that ruling is the work associated with philosophers and for 
which they are groomed because of their moral and intellectual abilities. Ruling is said to be 
among the work that reason does better than anything else (353d3-538). As a rational activity, 
then, ruling is in some ways akin to contemplation and might be thought most compatible with it 
of the three types of occupation.  
In sum, while the spontaneous philosopher is not fully developed, the fully-formed 
philosopher who does not rule is forced into some line of work that is more deleterious to 
contemplation than ruling.39 The besotted philosopher thus falls short.  
The Deceitful Philosopher. A third type we might invoke we can call "deceitful" 
philosophers. Might the philosophers be able to abuse their position by deceiving the other 
 
38 This text refers to the soul rather than reason in particular, but it is clear that reason is meant. 
39 Section 2's discussion of spontaneous philosophers raised but left unanswered the possibility that the 
philosophers would benefit from not ruling. What we have just said about the besotted philosopher 
applies to them, too. It's no advantage to a spontaneous philosopher to be able to avoid ruling (though it's 
no harm, either). The best that "lovers of wisdom" can hope for is to hide behind a wall and be content 
with loving philosophy privately while the storm of the misdirected city rages around them (496d).  
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classes — appearing to rule but not really doing so — and taking more of what they want? 
Whatever organization of producers and warriors that the philosophers order (apparently 
benignly) in order to maximize their contemplation will be taken as just.  
This figure does not appear in the return to the cave, but Socrates might have such a 
character in mind when he says (at 466) that a philosopher might use his power to make 
everything in the city his own.40 In response, Socrates states that a philosopher who somehow 
thinks that she could do better has become enthralled by a "silly and adolescent" view of 
happiness. Socrates continues: "He'll come to know that Hesiod was truly wise in saying that 
"the half is somehow worth more than the whole." The reference is to the opening of Works and 
Days, where Hesiod says that he and his brother should settle their dispute (over their 
inheritance) according to the perfect law of Zeus. This law does not allow each person to have 
everything his heart desires, for Zeus has hidden the means of effortless living from human 
beings. By invoking Hesiod in this way, Socrates means that a philosopher would be foolish to 
think that he can do any better than upkeep at public expense. To attempt to gain more is only 
asking for trouble.  
We saw the reason for this above. Each class in the city agree to work for the others as 
well as itself because it has wants that are better satisfied by others. Not only does each of the 
classes not only get some good from the others, but they all need what the others provide in order 
to perform their own function well. To repeat with a basic example, if farmers refuse to farm, 
cobblers can't cobble, which is in turn disadvantageous to the farmers, because they want shoes. 
So, if the farmers refuse to farm, they will actually get less of what they want (here, shoes, but 
more generally, pleasure and freedom from pain) because cobblers and all of the other classes 
will be negatively affected by not having food to eat. Similarly, if philosophers refuse to rule or, 
as we are now considering, are deceptive in doing so, the other classes will not be best governed, 
which in turn negatively affects the philosophers, who, as described above, depend on the 
 
40 Socrates seems to be thinking of a philosopher who has grown up in a good city and completed the 
course of education, because he is speaking of the philosopher as being supported by the city in exchange 
for ruling it. 
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material goods and security from the other classes.41  
The Wealthy Philosopher. Since the problem for the besotted philosopher is work, we 
might consider the "wealthy" philosopher. To my knowledge, this character does not appear in 
Republic and indeed this philosopher could not appear in the best city, since the material 
conditions of the philosophers are strictly controlled. Thus, even if we now conclude that this 
type of philosopher does better by not ruling, it would not invalidate the claim that no better life 
is available to Republic's philosophers. This third philosopher is briefly considered here as the 
"last best hope" for real-world42 circumstances under which philosophers profit by not ruling.43 
In the best city, philosophers rule but are supported; in other cases, they do not rule but are not 
supported. If we grant a philosopher independent wealth, he could not rule, yet be supported. 
Might the balance thus be tipped in favor of not ruling?  
The wealthy philosopher in an ordinary city is able to hire or buy his own producers, and 
his own mercenaries too, to defend himself from outside attack and to control the producers. 
What would this gain him? It's not clear that anything is gained, as this scenario puts the wealthy 
philosopher in (almost) the same position as the philosopher in the good city — he rules over a 
network of producers and warriors. He escapes any productive or military work but he is stuck 
with organizing the means to the fulfillment of his material and security needs, as well as those 
of his subordinates.  
Perhaps, however, all he need do is hire someone to act as an overseer, and escape the 
task of ruling. But the overseer does not understand how to govern in the same way that the 
philosopher could, if he put his mind to it. The overseer does not know how to best select people 
for positions and arrange who is to do what and how to settle disputes by making constant 
 
41 A response to the thought that a deceitful philosopher might deceive his fellow philosophers in 
pretending to rule but not actually doing so is included in fn. 28, above. 
42 Life in the Isles of the Blessed is not an option. As Reeve puts it, "A life of pure philosophy, like a life 
spent perpetually as if at festival, is not a practically possible option for a human being" (p. 203). 
43 Similarly, if the concern is making an individual into a philosopher (as was discussed in the part 2) 
someone might say "Well, what if the parents of a would-be philosopher can provide her with sustenance 
and security? Wouldn't she then be able to reach the heights of knowledge?"  
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reference to the forms.44 Moreover, the philosopher who plays his part in the good city has the 
easier task and the more secure position. For the wealthy philosopher, the allegiance of the 
overseer, the producers and the warriors is tenuous, as they do not work for the philosopher but 
for themselves. They are not moderate. The warriors, for example, might abandon or sacrifice 
this philosopher in troubled times, or try to overthrow him because they are attracted by the 
wealth of a person who can afford to have so many others work for him and by the possibility of 
taking over that network of people. 
It might yet be objected that either a wealthy philosopher or a deceitful philosopher could 
possibly do better than a philosopher-ruler if only in the short run. One form of this objection 
imagines a scenario in which the philosopher will die in two days but the effect of not ruling will 
not be evident for three, and so the philosopher abdicates her responsibilities in favor of a last 
binge of contemplation.45 But more details are required to make this "short-term profit" 
plausible: What will cause the death? Is the philosopher suffering from some disease which 
would nonetheless permit contemplation and ruling (though no ruling is done)? And so on. By 
demanding these details I mean to expose the objection as portraying an unlikely and 
unforeseeable eventuality. In general, people makes plans for what seems reasonable to expect 
and live their lives accordingly. In the case of the philosophers, the plan is to stick with the life in 
which they rule the city which supports them. Non-philosophy-or-ruling-disabling-but-life-
ending-diseases can be handled if and when they arise.46 Even if the right thing to do in this 
situation is to abandon ruling for philosophy, this would not disprove that the philosopher had 
abandoned ruling in general. Republic's claim is rather that a life of ruling, amongst other 
 
44 If we re-imagine the wealthy philosopher as a regular (though wealthy) private citizen, the job for the 
overseer gets easier, perhaps, but the life of the philosopher does not change. 
45 Kraut (1973) p. 332. Kraut (1991) calls the claim that the philosopher does best in terms of 
contemplation a "speculative and doubtful empirical calculation" (p. 50). My aim in this article might be 
described as showing that not ruling is a speculative and doubtful calculation.  
46 For Socrates a last binge would only be a last binge of philosophy on this earth; the real binge is about 
to (re-)commence. Freedom from the body might improve the philosopher's position with respect to 
contemplation and the response to the illness might be to get in as much ruling as possible before dying.  
24 
25 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. IV 2010 Issue 1 
 
 
 
                                                
activities, is best, and the activities include (and in the case of the dying philosopher, have 
included) both ruling and philosophy.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
My goal in this article has been to show that there is a straightforward way to maintain 
the main thesis of Republic, namely, that justice is better than injustice, while simultaneously 
holding that philosophers primarily value philosophical activity. In order to support this claim I 
have emphasized that justice means an interdependence of the parts of the city, and of the soul, 
which enables each part to flourish maximally. Secondly, I argued that for philosophers there is 
no better life available, first (and more generally) because someone inferior will rule and 
misdirect the city and secondly (and more specifically) because there is no way to compensate 
for the support offered by the citizens of the kallipolis. In none of the possible alternatives — the 
spontaneous philosopher, the besotted philosopher, the deceitful philosopher or the wealthy 
philosopher — whether in an ordinary city or in the best, does philosophy profit from not ruling. 
The philosophers are as happy as can be.47  
While I think that many scholars wrongly believe that contemplation is negatively 
affected by ruling, they need not give up anything of their own answers to this question of the 
philosophers' benefit to accept that philosophers also do best in terms of contemplation. In other 
words, I think that there is no contradiction between the "demands" of justice, or of the forms, 
(whichever kind of approach one takes, or both), and the desire for contemplation.48 Indeed, not 
 
47 Brickhouse (1981, p. 150-1) for example argues that a better life is not available to the philosopher 
because he is morally constrained by his debt to the city. This is a different sense of "possible life" (which 
can be true in addition to which I have argued here). 
48 Why is there this insistence on the part of scholars to show that the philosophers fare worse in terms of 
contemplation and must be compensated for it in some way? Speculatively, I think it's because of a desire 
(on the part of scholars) to show that philosophers are unlike the other people who try to rule for their 
own advantage by showing that they are not egoists (beginning, perhaps, with Kraut (1973)). But they go 
too far, I think, towards making the philosophers self-disinterested. The approach I have taken here 
suggests that what distinguishes the philosophers from those others who want to rule in their in own 
interests is not that they do not rule in their own interests — they do — but that they also rule in the 
interest of others and can see that the unrestrained pursuit of their own interest is self-defeating. They do 
not, however, have to make a sacrifice. 
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only is there no contradiction, but, as I hope I have showed, thinking in terms of contemplation 
or of justice as Socrates defines it are two aspects of the same theory — maximal contemplation 
and justice towards the other parts go hand in hand.49  
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